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One of the great joys of being a scien-
tist is the hunt for an elusive signal within
the noise of data, opinions, biases, and
other human foibles associated with the
pursuit of knowledge. It is inevitable that
this imperfect quest will result in many
false starts along the way when looking
“through a glass, darkly.” Our imperfect
and incomplete knowledge of the world
must look like an unpolished mirror,
reflecting gibberish, at times. However, it
also reflects an underlying signal that bears
further scrutiny, in spite of our instinct
to discard a flawed image of reality. The
pursuit of the neural underpinnings of
creative cognition is certainly that “dark
glass” we peer into so intently, attempt-
ing to grasp, through our meager instru-
ments, some hidden truth. Many thinkers
and researchers have found that creativity
and madness seem somehow to be inter-
twined, but the signal is weak, the image
blurry, and the propensity toward roman-
tic stereotypes is high. And yet, as scien-
tists, we can only follow the data, trying
to make sense of what it tells us. So, rather
than entertain the premise outright let me
take you on a bit of a journey (which will
end back at madness, I promise).
First: What if evolutionary processes
selected for two types of reasoning?
Cosmides and Tooby hypothesized a “ded-
icated intelligence” that “refers to the
ability of a computational system to
solve predefined, target set of prob-
lems.” These problems often involve well
established rules—like your mundane
life, and Raven’s Matrices problems, and
acquiring a language (Pinker, 1991). The
other problems require “improvisational
intelligence” referring to “the ability of a
computational system to improvise solu-
tions to novel problems” (Cosmides and
Tooby, 2002). These problems are more
transient and involve contingencies that
may or may not persist over time—like
figuring out how to get into your car, hav-
ing locked your keys inside. Philosophers
call the former type of problem solving
“deductive reasoning”—the observations
necessarily result in a conclusion being
made based on the evidence. They are rule
based, deterministic, and the cause leads
naturally to effect. The latter problem solv-
ing is called “abductive reasoning”—there
are an infinite number of possible solu-
tions to the myriad challenges faced in
the world; therefore a theory best explains
the observation, given the evidence. This
reasoning is probabilistic, involves approx-
imation, and (importantly) guessing. Both
methods are adaptive: one for problems
that are familiar, the other for problems
that have never been encountered before.
Kanazawa (2004) views intelligence
(incorrectly), the pinnacle of deductive
reasoning, as THE domain-specific adap-
tation to solving novel problems in the
environment. However, it is my contention
that intelligence and creativity occupy two
extremes of a dichotomy: intelligence sup-
plies a “dedicated reasoning capacity” for
problems that possess rule-based, cause-
effect relationships. Others have covered
well, and provide empirical support for,
the “general purpose problem solving”
capacity of intelligence and “g” (Kaufman
et al., 2011): I am merely saying here that
the mechanism is rather “dedicated” to
cause-effect relationships—a capacity with
broad applicability to deductive reason-
ing tasks. In contrast, creativity emerged
as an adaptive cognitive mechanism for
low frequency, “improvisational reason-
ing,” where solutions to problems are
unsighted (Simonton, 2013), and proba-
bilistic approximation could lead to novel
solutions. Creative reasoning solves the
minority of problems that are unforeseen
and yet of high adaptability: “The light-
ning has struck the tree near the camp
and set it on fire. The fire is now spread-
ing to the dry underbrush. What should I
do?” (Kanazawa, 2004). In this conceptu-
alization, creativity is an evolved cognitive
mechanism to abstract, to synthesize, to
solve non-recurrent problems in the envi-
ronment. Finally, intelligence should be
seen as a rather stable evolved mechanism
over the last 1.6 million years (i.e., the
singular “innovation” being the Acheulean
hand ax), while creativity appears to have
appeared, in humans at least, in the
last ∼30,000 years (Gabora and Kaufman,
2010). Intelligence may not be evolution-
arily novel, but creativity certainly is.
Perhaps the most parsimonious the-
ory of creative cognition to incorporate
evolutionary principles is that of Blind
Variation and Selective Retention (BVSR)
(Campbell, 1960). Indeed, his the-
ory posits that creativity in humans
“represent(s) cumulated inductive
achievements, stage by stage expansions
of knowledge beyond what could have
been deductively derived from what had
been previously known.” Moreover, this
creative process possesses three necessary
conditions: “a mechanism for intro-
ducing variation, a consistent selection
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process, and a mechanism for preserving
and reproducing the selected variations.”
Simonton, more recently, assessed and
extended BVSR theory, a half-century
after its inception, by addressing the
shortfalls of Campbell’s imprecise defi-
nition of what it means for a variation
to be “blind:” creativity and discovery
are not blind, rather ideas are blind to
the extent that the utilities are initially
unknown. In contrast, sighted ideas are
guided by prior applicable ideas (a.k.a.
acquired expertise) (Simonton, 2011).
Simonton argues that the “blind vari-
ation” component of the theory does
not imply that ideas are randomly gen-
erated, stating “as long as the probabilities
of any generated responses are decou-
pled from their utilities, the responses
are blind without the necessity of being
random” (Simonton, 2011). Campbell’s
notion of BVSR provides an evolutionary
framework for creative cognition and has
emerged as a “universal selection theory”
for numerous other disciplines ranging
from neuroscience, to computer science,
to philosophy (Simonton, 2010).
Moreover, in Campbell’s framework,
creative thought represents a simulation
or “substitution” of representations of
the environment in ones mind, with
the “solution” being selected from the
numerous thought experiments under-
taken, “according to a criterion which is in
itself substituting for an external state of
affairs.” When put into action, the selec-
tively retained solution results in “intel-
ligent behavior” (if adaptive) as opposed
to blind floundering. Campbell provides
numerous examples of thinkers relying
upon “chance combinations” of ideas that
appear to coalesce into workable solutions,
with Poincaré most famously describ-
ing five stages of creative thought (later
trimmed to four) including preparation,
incubation, illumination, and verification
(Poincaré, 1908). All have in common
the notion of “trial and error” thinking
resulting in an “insight” or “solution” that
appears to be most adapted to a given
problem in the world. An important impli-
cation of the BVSRmodel is that the results
of creative thought are rather disconnected
from their antecedents—it is not sufficient
to have great minds in order to have cre-
ative solutions, just many minds and/or
many variations: “insofar as there has been
a genuine gain in knowledge, the differ-
ence between a hit and a miss lies in the
selective conditions thus newly encoun-
tered, not in talent differences in the gen-
eration of the trials.”
Taken one step further, and with
Cambell’s dichotomy of BVSR in mind,
it is not a great leap of imagination to
posit that: the “dedicated” cognitive mech-
anism resides within conscious awareness,
with full access to memory stores, plan-
ning, attention, and action algorithms
serving smooth allocation of resources
toward adaptive responses to ongoing,
predictable, environmental demands.
Measures of such dedicated cognitive
mechanisms, termed “IQ” should be (and
indeed are) highly correlated with nearly
all measures of adaptive ability, includ-
ing height, health, education, occupation,
income, longevity—a staggering array of
fitness indicators (Gottfredson, 1997).
Stretching our imagination a bit more, we
might infer that the improvisational mech-
anism (unfortunately almost exclusively
measures of divergent thinking) will be
inconsistently, negatively, and/or weakly
correlated with measures of adaptive fit-
ness due to the very low recurrence of
such environmental problems (Kanazawa,
2004), the inadequacy of measurement of
the underlying cognitive construct (Arden
et al., 2010), and the poor correlation
between antecedents and their ultimate
effective solutions (Simonton, 2014).
In the next step, we can now synthesize
the cognitive systems with hypothesized
neural mechanisms: the dedicated system
is likely to rely upon EXPLICIT or con-
scious knowledge, while the improvisa-
tional system relies more upon IMPLICIT
or unconscious knowledge systems (Helie
and Sun, 2010). The interaction of explicit
and implicit systems can be seen to form
the basis of effective, adaptive problem
solving within an organism required to
solve both common and novel problems
in the world. Finally, at a neural net-
work level, the explicit/dedicated system
would appear to have significant over-
lap with the cognitive control network,
while the implicit/improvisational system
would appear to overlap significantly with
the default mode network (Jung et al.,
2013).
But what of madness? This is where
we really must stretch our thinkers to
hypothesize where things might go awry,
as they always do, out in the messy
world of biological beings. Two compet-
ing mechanisms are at play in the human
brain, one driving toward abstraction, the
other toward certainty. At the far extreme
of one end of this highly adaptive bell
curve resides psychosis: all things are
linked together; all things are related to
me; all things are relevant (manifesting
as delusions, hallucinations, disorganized
speech/behavior). The link between cre-
ative genius and psychoticism is not new,
having been explored by Eysenck with
regard to that rare bird “genius” (Eysenck,
1995). However, true psychosis is a rather
rare phenomenon—the lifetime incidence
being around 3%, as opposed to “mad-
ness” in general (Perälä et al., 2007). At the
other extreme is adherence to rigid, rule-
based, behavior—the far reaches of which
might naturally encompass autism spec-
trum disorders (ASD’s)—also very rare,
with a recent total population prevalence
found to be 2.64% (Kim et al., 2011). This
dichotomy (i.e., psychosis/autism) is not
a new hypothesis, having been recently
(and brilliantly) applied to “the social
brain,” (Crespi and Badcock, 2008). Nor
is it a radical departure from Carson’s
“shared vulnerability model,” (Carson,
2013) although factors leading to extremes
of either creativity (e.g., cognitive flexibil-
ity, low latent inhibition) or intelligence
(e.g., cognitive closure, high sensitivity)
are seen to be pathological in the cur-
rent model. What is new is to apply this
dichotomy to the reasoning brain as mani-
fested through intelligent and creative pur-
suits (Figure 1).
Can one be both “mad” (i.e., overtly
psychotic) and creative? Certainly no evi-
dence exists that creative genius (or even
garden variety creativity) lurks, emerges,
or is unleashed in the presence of overt
psychosis (or autism for that matter,
savants notwithstanding). Might these
examples of “madness” reside at the
extreme ends of continua that produced
more adaptive levels of flexibility and
order (a.k.a. novelty vs. usefulness) (Stein,
1953)? Certainly possible, and increasing
evidence suggests this to be so (Nettle,
2006; Glazer, 2009; Kyaga et al., 2011;
Fink et al., 2012). Are all of these
ideas empirically testable? Indeed, they
are—and should be—through falsifiable
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FIGURE 1 | Proposed model for dichotomy of reasoning pressures on human evolution with
cognitive, neuronal, and behavioral correlates.
hypotheses as opposed to anecdote, hyper-
bole, or press release. But beware! When
on a scientific journey, looking “through
a glass, darkly,” one might see all sorts
of strange things at the far edges of
the known world—some even breathing
fire—but shedding little light (Dietrich,
2014).
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